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Abstract 
We examine whether a strong indigenous manufacturing base is a necessary condition 
for sustainable economic growth in the case of two small, open economies, Ireland 
and Sweden. Sweden has been impacted by the economic crisis to a lesser degree than 
Ireland; we explore (through a manufacturing activity lens) the reasons for the 
asymmetric impacts and ask if the nature of the shock is related to ‘Economic 
Sovereignty’ and to the type of industrial policy.  We argue Sweden was less affected 
given that its indigenous firms control the highly export-focussed and technology-
based engineering sector whereas in Ireland high-technology sectors are controlled by 
foreign firms. In terms of policy implications, we suggest that industrial policy should 
aim for sustainable economic activity and growth such that industrial activity within 
the economy should be able to minimise the impact of asymmetric shocks such as the 
current global economic recession.   
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Introduction 
High-profile Multinational Enterprise (MNE) job losses have featured regularly in the 
Irish news of late contributing significantly to Ireland’s unemployment rate (13.4 per 
cent in December 2010; CSO 2010). Such developments have put into question the 
sustainability of Ireland’s industrial policy which, we argue, has focused most of its 
efforts on FDI/MNEs to the detriment of an indigenous (largely SME) sector. This 
paper argues that industrial economic development  policy should aim for sustainable 
economic activity and growth; industrial activity within the economy should be able 
to minimise the impact of asymmetric shocks such as the current global economic 
recession.   
 
In light of the above, the current paper asks whether a strong indigenous industrial 
base is a necessary condition for sustainable economic growth. We explore this issue 
in a number of ways. On a general level, we approach the question via the experience 
of two countries (Ireland and Sweden) comparable on the basis of their size and 
openness. We also look at whether Ireland can learn from the industrial development 
trajectory of the Swedish economy. Other countries (especially EU accession States) 
have held Ireland up as a role model for industrial development [e.g. Sapir et al, 2003; 
Sapir, 2005, 2006; and Acs et al., 2007], while others have taken a more nuanced and 
balanced view (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006; Bailey et al., 2009). Our 
approach is radically different: we look at Sweden to assess the Irish industrial 
development strategy adopted to date and to garner lessons for future industrial 
policy. The economy of Sweden seems to have been less negatively impacted than 
Ireland by the recent economic downturn. We explore reasons for the asymmetric 
effects of the shock. Is it due to the fact that Swedish industrial policy has placed 
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more emphasis on having a balanced/diversified industrial sector in terms of firm 
ownership (whether indigenous/foreign); size; and sectors? In addressing these issues, 
we examine the growth impact at the level of the firm in terms of a number of 
indicators: e.g., employment, competitiveness, GDP, productivity and innovation, 
disaggregated by firm ownership. In particular, we explore the issue of whether 
economies less reliant on MNE activity and/or with a more thriving indigenous base 
are less vulnerable to the intensity of external shocks. 
 
Section 1 introduces key conceptual issues and theoretical underpinnings of this paper 
by defining the term ‘sustainable economic growth’ in terms of industrial economic 
activity and policy.  Section 2 depicts the impact of the shock on Ireland and Sweden 
in terms of growth rates, exports and employment. Section 3 outlines the development 
of Irish industrial activity and associated policies so as to shed light on the engine of 
structural change. For comparative purposes, Section 3 provides some brief insights 
into the industrial development trajectory in Sweden. Section 4 analyses the 
nationality of firms as an explanatory factor in the different impacts of the shock 
within the two economies. The analysis is somewhat hampered by the lack of data 
disaggregated by firm ownership (particularly in the case of Sweden), but key insights 
still emerge. Section 5 concludes the analysis and suggests some recommendations for 
policy.  
 
Section 1: Sustainable Economic Growth 
  
1.1. Definitional issues 
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Between the mid-1980s and mid-2008, the concept of ‘sustainable economic growth’ 
was overshadowed by that of short-term economic growth (by sustainable economic 
growth we mean positive and relatively high growth rates in the short-term that do not 
undermine long-term growth). A number of external shocks characterised this period 
of time (the collapse of the Berlin wall, the Asian economic crisis and the dot.com 
crash), but western economies rebounded relatively quickly. A major shock, such as 
the current banking crisis which has progressively been eroding the global real 
economy, brings to the fore the idea of ‘economic vulnerability’ (Andreosso-
O’Callaghan, 2007 and Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Bassino, 2008). The same 
external shock can have a different impact on two economies, depending on their 
relative level of ‘vulnerability’. Economic vulnerability to external shocks can be 
minimised with increased independence or sovereignty. Economic dependence, as 
defined by Tiano (1982), means that a country lacks the essentials in terms of 
economic policy making, technology and finance; financial dependence arises when a 
country has a demand for financial capital which exceeds its domestic supply of 
financial assets leading to growing national debt. In turn, dependence implies 
diminishing (economic) sovereignty,   
 
1.2. Implications for this research  
 
With regard to industrial development, we define economic sovereignty on the basis 
of the relative importance of indigenous firms in the manufacturing sector (and in 
particular those manufacturing firms engaged in higher value-added activities), since 
economic independence is an inverse relationship of inward foreign capital.  Post 
WWII globalisation has involved nearly every nation of the world and has encroached 
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on most aspects of economic activity, bringing with it the risk of decreased economic 
sovereignty. However, globalisation and diminished economic sovereignty should not 
be seen as synonymous; this implies that there is an optimal level of diminishing 
sovereignty (globalisation) (Bagwell and Staiger, 2001).  Looking at the case of 
specific EU countries, can one ask whether economies closest to maintaining an 
optimal level of diminished sovereignty through appropriate industrial policies are 
less affected by the current economic crisis? And relatedly, are they more likely to 
benefit from sustainable economic growth?  
 
Section 2: An analysis of the impact of the shock  
 
2.1. Impact analysis   
(i) Macroeconomic indicators 
Table 1 depicts figures relating to a number of macroeconomic indicators before and 
since the crisis (2011 data are forecasts). 
Table 1 here 
 
According to Table 1, the current shock has had a more intense and lasting effect in 
Ireland than in Sweden. In Ireland, the decline in economic growth for 2009 is more 
pronounced than that of Sweden; whereas growth resumed in Sweden in 2010, this 
was not the case for the Irish economy. Of specific note is the size of the current 
account deficit in the case of Ireland, from 2006 to 2010, in sharp contrast with a 
continuous surplus in Sweden. Faced with negative growth prospects, the two 
countries have brought radically different policy measures to the crisis. Swedish 
authorities have responded to the crisis with an expansionary fiscal and monetary 
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policy, announcing in December 2008 a stimulus package (of €2.2bn over 3 years) 
and a low interest rate.
2
 This explains in part why GDP figures for 2010 and 2011 
show a recovery and why price stability was maintained throughout the crisis. On the 
banking side, Swedish banks have a relatively high exposure to over-leveraged East 
European countries, in particular to the Baltic region (with real growth in Estonia and 
Lithuania having declined by more than 13 per cent in 2009 (EUROSTAT 2010), but 
this exposure is marginal when compared with the Irish banks’ property burden. 
Consequently and by contrast, the severe collapse in property related taxes in Ireland 
has led to an increasing budget deficit; as a result, a restrictive budgetary policy has 
been implemented so as to lessen the impact on the government debt, which is 
forecast to reach nearly 100 per cent of GDP in 2011. Sweden’s general government 
debt was 43.4 per cent in 2010, half that of Ireland’s. Through these figures, the 
success of Sweden compared to Ireland in relation to policy response, can easily be 




By virtue of their size, both economies are highly dependent on exports. Swedish 
exports represent some 50 per cent of the country’s GDP, making Sweden dependent 
on the buoyancy of the world market in general and of the EU market in particular, 
since the latter absorbs almost two-thirds of its exports. According to recent figures, 
Swedish exports of manufactured products declined in 2009 by over 10 per cent 
compared with the previous year. However, 2010 saw exports reach 2008 levels, 
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reversing the decline experienced in 2009.
3
 This original decline affected primarily 
the manufacturing sector, which is the source of more than 70 per cent of all Swedish 
exports. The engineering sector (encompassing Machinery Equipment, Office 
Machinery, Electrical Machinery, Optical Instruments, Motor Vehicles and Other 
Transport) represents nearly 42 per cent of total Swedish manufacturing exports. This 
compares with nearly 36 per cent of all manufacturing exports in the case of Ireland. 
Chemical exports dominate in Ireland, representing 30 per cent of the total in 2006 – 
more than twice that of Chemicals in total manufacturing exports from Sweden. These 
figures indicate that both countries’ export structure is typical of countries 
specialising in technology-based industries. However, an important differentiating 
factor is Ireland’s narrow specialisation in some segments of these particular 
industries. Judging by CSO trade data for the years 2008-2010, the strong euro does 
not seem to have had a negative bearing on the Irish trade balance and, admittedly, on 
competitiveness. Although both imports and exports contracted at the beginning of the 
crisis, the Irish trade surplus increased by more than 50% between 2007 and 2009. 
This is in part owed to a vigorous tradable services sector. During the course of 2010, 
both countries have benefited from a weakening currency; the floating Swedish krona 
has depreciated with respect to all major currencies in 2010, but so has the euro-dollar 
(and also euro-sterling) exchange rate since the summer 2010. These factors 
contributed to a revival of exports in both cases.   
 
(iii) Unemployment  
Between December 2008 and December 2009, unemployment increased steadily in 
Sweden, resulting in an unemployment rate of 9 per cent in December 2009 (Figure 
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1a). However, 2010 saw a reversal of this trend with unemployment falling rapidly. 
According to Statistics Sweden, by November 2010 Sweden’s unemployment rate had 
reduced to 7.1 per cent. 
Figure 1a here 
 
Figure 1b here 
Figure 1.b. portrays the sudden increase in unemployment in Ireland. As can be seen, 
the unemployment rate gravitated around 4 to 5 per cent between 2005 and 2007. As 
of  December 2010, unemployment had increased to 13.4 per cent. The increase in job 
losses during the current economic crisis is much higher in Ireland than in Sweden. 
Between 2006 and 2009, the unemployment rate increased by a third in Sweden (from 
7 to 9%) and thereafter has fallen back to 7.1 per cent, whereas in Ireland the rate 
more than trebled (from 4.4 to 13.4%). Judging by this indicator alone, and in spite of 
a relatively favourable trade performance, the crisis seems to be an asymmetric shock, 
since it hit Ireland much harder.   
Secondly, the drop in employment in Sweden took place primarily within the 
manufacturing industry whereas in Ireland, the construction sector was hardest hit. 
Figures released by the Swedish Statistical Office show that some 48 per cent of job 
losses during the year 2008 were attributable to contraction in the manufacturing 
sector, as opposed to 14 per cent in building and construction. In Ireland, the 
construction sector was responsible for about 30 per cent of all job losses in the same 




 During 2009, although most of Ireland’s job losses were still in building and 
construction (24.4 per cent), manufacturing losses rose (22.7 per cent), and greater 
knock-on effects were felt in all services (except banking, finance and insurance). It 
should be noted that by 2008, the construction sector represented in Ireland 11.4 per 
cent of the total labour force; this compares with 6.2 per cent in Sweden in the same 
year, a ratio more in line with the stage of development of a mature economy. The 
manufacturing sector plays a stable role in economic growth, in contrast with the 
transitory nature of the building sector and with the derived nature of job creation in 
many services (e.g, buoyancy from building fuelling demand for real estate services, 
wholesale and retail trade). Although in any economy job losses and closures are 
typical negative indicators in a severe crisis, the increase in unemployment in 
Sweden’s manufacturing sector is linked to decreases in exports, due to a contraction 
of global trade from Swedish firms (be they indigenous or foreign). By contrast, 
Ireland’s manufacturing job losses can largely be explained by the withdrawal of 
mostly US-owned MNEs. MNEs in Ireland are characterised by higher export 
intensity than indigenous firms across all industries (Ruane and Ugur, 2004). This 
suggests that the increase in Swedish exports in 2010 directly influenced the reversal 
of the unemployment rate in that country, whereas the misfortunes of the US economy 
increasingly affected manufacturing, construction and non-tradable services 
employment in Ireland. 
2.2. Explaining the severity of the shock 
A number of indicators can be used to explain the ability of an economy to withstand 
external competitive and other adverse pressures. Cost-based indicators are among the 
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most popular. The performance of an economy can be appraised by its 
competitiveness level
5
, a concept used here in its most narrow sense, i.e. price (or 
cost) competitiveness. Figure 2 shows strikingly that Sweden, a rather (price) 
uncompetitive country in the 1980s and Ireland became more price competitive 
during the following decade. By contrast, the two countries lost price competitiveness, 
particularly in the first decade of the new millennium and up to the crisis. 
Figure 2 here 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
Figure 3 shows the corporate tax rate for the two economies over the period 1981-
2009.  Ireland’s corporate tax rate has decreased steadily since 1988 with a 
particularly sharp decrease since 1994. In Sweden, the corporate tax rate has been 
reduced over time with a rate of 28 per cent since 1994. Both economies have reduced 
their corporate tax rates over the period 1989-1998, in line with the aim of tax 
harmonisation within the EU. Ireland, however, is advantaged by its 12.5 per cent 
corporation tax from 2003 onwards.   
Figure 4 here 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4, both Ireland and Sweden have seen an increase in unit 
labour costs throughout the period 1970-2009. The unit labour cost in Ireland has 
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increased from 10.59 in 1970 to 108.0 in 2009. Over the same period, the index for 
Sweden increased from 15.85 to 111.6.  We see that unit labour costs were higher in 
Sweden between 1970 and 1980, and again after 1989.  Energy is another important 
cost for firms. Figure 5 shows the consumer price index of energy in the two 
economies; in Ireland, the consumer price index of energy increased smoothly over 
time from 18.0 in 1976 to 113.4 in 2009. In the same period, Sweden’s consumer 
price index increased from 11.6 to 116. The differential was highest over the period 
1978-1992; from 1993 to 2002, the two economies’ CPI of energy was very similar. 
However, from 2002 onwards Sweden’s energy CPI has been higher than Ireland’s.   
Figure 5 here 
Across three of the four competitiveness indicators (CPI of energy, unit labour costs 
and energy), Sweden does not perform worse or any better than Ireland. There must 
therefore be another explanation for Sweden’s better macroeconomic performance in 
the current crisis. Why are manufacturing firms in Sweden less exposed to the impact 
of the shock than those in Ireland? We answer this question by turning to factors such 
as structural change; industrial/enterprise policy (section 3), and firm nationality 
(whether a firm is indigenous or foreign-owned) (section 4).    
 
Section 3: Structural change (1970-2007) and industrial development activity 
and policy 
3.1. Industrial development activity and policy in Ireland  
 
In light of our focus on indigenous/foreign firm mix, we examine the various 
industrial/enterprise development policies pursued in Ireland over the decades.  From 
1970-2007, agricultural activity declining from a peak in the 1970s. As expected of a 
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prosperous economy, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, gross output in services as a 
share of total output trended upward, reaching a peak around 2007. The share of 
manufacturing output in total output rose steadily after 1980 (with brief declines in 




The Period 1950-1970 
Beginning with the Economic Development Plan (1958), Irish policymakers focussed 
on attracting FDI. In the 1960s, Ireland’s economic policy changed from inward-
looking protectionism to external openness. Its industrial strategy became one of 
‘industrialisation by invitation’. As outlined by Begley et al. (2005), in the 1960s a 
wave of predominately US-owned companies set up operations in Ireland. A key 
incentive during this period was Ireland’s zero per cent tax on profits generated 
through exports (when Ireland entered the Common Market in 1973, a 10% corporate 
tax rate was imposed on export-oriented firms). Most companies that came to Ireland 
were well-established, mature industries who simply transferred manufacturing and 
assembly line operations to Ireland in areas such as textile, electrical goods, and 
electrical and mechanical components. There were very few supply chain linkages 
between these companies and local indigenous companies (Begley et al, 2005).  
 
The Period 1970-1980 
From 1973 onwards, Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority (IDA) focussed on 
attracting FDI in sectors such as electronics, chemicals and other ‘high-technology’ 
industries. The 1970s brought new firms in new sectors, such as Pfizer in the 
pharmaceutical and chemicals sector and Wang in the computer industry. However, 
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computer firms tended to engage in low-value assembly activities. From 1970-1980, 
the vast majority of those employed in manufacturing in Ireland (approx. 23%) were 
in the food and beverages industry. Approximately 16% were engaged in electrical 
and optical equipment industriess. The situation remained broadly the same for the 
following decade (1980-1990).   
 
The Period 1980-1990 
In the 1980s, basic MNE software activity was attracted to Ireland. Additional 
pharmaceutical companies and MNEs in other sectors also began processing and 
manufacturing activities in Ireland.  The 1980s also witnessed an industrial policy of 
creating sectoral and spatial clusters. Clusters were focussed around two sectors: 
electronics (microprocessors, software, computer products and printers) and 
chemicals/pharmaceuticals. While empirical evidence on the impact of industrial 
clusters in Ireland is limited, it suggests that there has been little sectoral clustering 
between MNEs and local firms (Gleeson et al., 2005 and Buckley and Ruane 2006).   
 
The ‘crisis’ in the 1980s was partly due to the fact that the Irish government had 
embarked on deficit financed expenditure programmes following oil price rises in the 
early 1970s and early 1980s.  MNEs responded to the crisis by reducing investment 
and repatriating profits (the same pattern as today), contributing to a deficit in the 
balance of payments amounting to approximately 10% of GNP.  Industrial 
development policy was criticised for its failure to support indigenous industry (e.g. 
Telesis Report, 1982). 
 
The 1990s onwards 
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As outlined previously, the food, beverage, and electrical/optical equipment industries 
dominated manufacturing employment for the period 1970-1990. Data from the 
EUKLEMS database (1990-2007)
7
 provides some interesting insights. Employment in 
the food, beverages industry declined from a peak of 23 per cent in 1990 to 19.3 per 
cent in 2007. In addition, the textile sector declined from 11 per cent in 1990 to a 
mere 2.6 per cent in 2007. Increases in the chemicals and electrical/optical equipment 
sectors occurred from 1990-2007. More specifically, employment in the chemicals 
sector increased from 7 per cent to 10.4 per cent; in the electrical/optical equipment 
sector, the increase went from 16 per cent to 23 per cent (reaching a peak of 25% in 
2000).   
 
A major industrial occurrence of the 1990s was the arrival of Dell Computer 
Corporation to Ireland. The company built on Ireland’s expertise in manufacturing, 
moved into supply-chain management, opened call centres and localised newly 
released software products for European markets. The 1990s witnessed the scaling 
down of Apple Computers manufacturing operation, to be replaced by software 
development and Apple’s main European support centre. Intel Corporation built three 
Irish plants in 1989, 1994 and 1997. The 1990s also saw the beginnings of a 
significant number of small indigenous software companies, in many cases spinoffs 
from MNE companies. Key MNEs in the medical devices sector included Boston 
Scientific Corporation and Guidant Corporation, which added critical mass to this 
particular sector. 
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One of the most significant industrial policy documents relating to SMEs and 
indigenous companies was published in 1992.
8
 The Culliton (1992) Report critically 
appraised the state of industrial development in Ireland. It pointed out a serious 
dichotomy between indigenous and foreign-owned firms highlighting that there was 
little connection between the two. It also expressed concerns about the branch plant 
nature of MNE activity in Ireland.  Another significant policy statement appeared in 
1994 with the publication of the ‘Task Force on Small Business Report’ (Government 
of Ireland, 1994). As outlined by Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan (2006), this 
was the first formal policy document by the Irish government on the small firm sector, 
despite the fact that as far back as 1979 some 95% of all manufacturing units could be 
classified as SMEs. Given that most SMEs in Ireland are indigenous firms
9
, one can 
reasonably argue that the Irish government overlooked the indigenous (largely SME 
sector) until the mid-1990s.  More recently, industrial/enterprise policy statements 
have recognised the importance of entrepreneurship and a thriving SME/Indigenous 
base of firms (‘Report of the Small Business Forum’ (2006) and “Building Ireland’s 
Smart Economy” (Government of Ireland, 2008)).    
 
The beginning of the new millennium saw some new entrants in software 
development, the e-business sector and bio-pharmaceutical, with some of these 
choosing to locate European and R&D activities in Ireland. High-profile examples 
included Google, which in 2003 opened its first overseas office (located in Dublin), e-
Bay and Genzyme Corporation. Many of the world’s leading pharmaceutical 
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 16 
companies set up operations in Ireland, including such household names as Pfizer; 
GlaxoSmithKline and Johnson & Johnson 
 
Growth rates of over 8 per cent prevailed in Ireland in the late 1990s. It is interesting 
to note that high growth in Ireland was achieved without major inroads into 
innovation. According to EUROSTAT (2010), the number of applications to the 
European Patent Office (EPO) by priority year
10
 shows that for the general 
manufacturing category, Sweden has made significantly more patent applications 
every year than has Ireland (97 against 1 in 1977; 917 versus 60 in 1987; and 1,403 
versus 144 in 2006).  
In summary, in spite of many policy documents stating otherwise, the Irish industrial 
policy approach placed de facto too much emphasis on FDI without recognising its 
limitations. Although FDI was a key contributor to the phenomenal growth rates of 
the late 1990s-2007 period (Gray, 1997), we argue that the overriding presence of FDI 
in policy implementation led to the neglect of the indigenous SME sector. In fact, 
Anyadike-Danes et al. (2010) argue that this preoccupation with the role of FDI helps 
explain why entrepreneurship does not appear in mainstream analysis and discussion 
of the factors behind Ireland’s economic growth. We would argue that the poor 
evaluation culture in Ireland (Lenihan, 1999, 2004; and Lenihan and Hart, 2004 and 
Lenihan and Hart, 2006) did not help the Irish government to see the ‘error’ of its 
ways earlier. If on-going thorough evaluation at both the micro (firm) and macro 
levels had been an inherent part of the industrial policy process, this imbalance of 
focus by policymakers on indigenous versus MNE firms would in all likelihood have 
been recognised earlier. 
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It is worth highlighting however that of late, the role of entrepreneurship in creating 
employment and driving economic growth is core in very recent enterprise policy 
documents (Innovation Taskforce 2010; Trading and Investing in a Smart Economy 
2010).  In terms of responding to the crisis from an enterprise policy perspective in 
Ireland, there have been no major developments of late (outside of for example, an 
enterprise stabilisation fund and a back to work allowance scheme). In our view, in 
this crisis it is not a shortage of ideas from policymakers and commentators (including 
academics) that is the problem but a lack of funding to deliver on such ideas. Given 
the strict austerity measures that the Irish Government has put in place (as part of an 
overall response to EU demands along with difficulties for Ireland in the banking 
sector and in sovereign debt markets in Europe) it is rather impossible to have any 
new enterprise policy interventions.   
 
Currently, one of the problems in this enterprise sphere is the difficulty for SMEs in 
accessing finance. According to a report on Entrepreneurship from the Certified 
Public Accountants in Ireland (2010), the most pressing threat to entrepreneurship and 
start-up activity in Ireland is late debtor payments coupled with difficulties in 
accessing finance. The overriding conclusion here is that nothing of any major impact 
or significance with respect to new (and much needed) enterprise policy interventions 
will happen in Ireland until the banking sector is restructured. There is currently a 
conflict between industrial policy (real economy) and other policies (something which 
is not new as outlined by Välilä (2008)); the task of the Irish Government and of 
any Government should be to find an adequate balance between reordering the 
financial/banking sector and stimulating growth (industrial policy).  
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3.2. Industrial development activity and policy in Sweden  
From the industrial take-off to the 1960s 
 
In terms of industrial development, Sweden is considered a slow starter as well-
known Swedish industries and companies took off only in the 1870s. Cheap 
electricity, due to the abundance of rivers and waterfalls, made Swedish products 
relatively competitive on the international (and European) market. An important 
infrastructural investment (in transport), as well as a growing labour force, were other 
factors behind the Swedish industrial take-off. At the end of the 19
th
 century, 
vertically integrated and export-oriented company groups began to form and 
investment in innovation in machinery products facilitated the emergence of 
engineering companies such as Ericsson and ASEA. To bypass the resurgence of 
protectionism in late 19
th
 century Europe, subsidiaries of Swedish firms were founded 
abroad. Several elements explain the unfolding broad anatomy of Swedish production 
over these critical decades of industrial take-off and development: extraction and 
processing of raw materials allowed the country to specialise in mechanical 
engineering technologies; major innovations in machinery products were intimately 
connected with export activities (Edquist and Lundvall, 1993). The ratio of 
engineering exports to total exports rose from 3 per cent in 1880 to 20 per cent in 
1950, one of the highest ratios in the world after the USA (Edquist and Lundvall, 
1993 
 
Period: 1970s and 1980s (the 'decades of uncertainty’) 
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Like most European countries, Sweden was sharply affected by the oil shocks of the 
1970s. The economic crisis opened the door to an ‘offensive’ industrial policy 
focusing on state ownership and public support to industries, including those in sunset 
areas such as textiles and shipbuilding (Benner, 1997). In spite of its many limitations, 
this ‘offensive’ policy led to some important institutional developments: the creation 
of a Swedish Board for Technical Development (which was to become NUTEK), and 
initiation of a number of public-private projects geared to the development of new 
technologies in nuclear energy, telecommunications and military aircraft areas 
(Benner, 1997). The 16 per cent devaluation of the Swedish krona in 1982 created a 
short term competitive advantage, by boosting manufacturing exports.  These decades 
were nevertheless marked by uncertainty in terms of industrial direction. The country 
was becoming increasingly specialised in low growth industries, to the detriment of 
more knowledge-intensive (high-tech and R&D intensive) industries. As documented 
by Edquist and Texier (1996), the proportion of production in R&D-intensive growth 
industries declined between 1975 and 1991.  
 
The 1990s: EU membership and a new take-off 
By putting an end to a few years of sharp banking and economic crisis, Sweden’s 
accession to the EU in 1995 allowed the country to exploit the economies of scale 
offered by the large EU market. The latter part of this decade was marked by a 
number of post-financial crisis positive changes perceptible in the production fabric of 
the country. In particular, Sweden was able to reverse previous trends of non-optimal 
export specialisation by increasing its export share in high-technology and high-
demand manufacturing products. In particular, Sweden’s remarkable performance in 
telecommunication equipment and pharmaceutical products substantially improved 
 20 
the country’s ranking as a high-technology world exporter (Braunerhjelm and Thulin, 
2004).  Structural change was initiated in the 1970s, when employment in sunset 
industries (textile and leather) plummeted as employment in the services sector 
increased. This structural change accelerated in the Swedish manufacturing sector 
during the 1990s, with an impressive growth of gross value added in 




The engineering sector represents today nearly 40 per cent of total 
manufacturing VA, manufacturing employment and total exports. This sector captures 
29 per cent of Swedish GDP. It operates at a high technological level and 
encompasses highly innovative large Swedish firms with a world dimension. This is 
the case for ASTRA, Pharmacia & Upjohn in the chemical industry; for SKF, the 
world producer of ball bearings; for ABB, which dominates power generation, power 
transmission and robotics: and for Volvo and SAAB in the transport industry. Over 
time, some firms have capitalised and diversified in sunrise industries; Ericson moved 
from mechanical engineering into electronics. The structure of production has been 
fairly stable, in that the engineering sector has been an important actor of industrial 
growth since WWII; structural change can nevertheless be seen in the case of 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, a growing industry over time. 
 
The contemporary period: the dawn of the new millennium and onwards 
With the advent of the new millennium, Swedish industrial policy saw a number of 
changes; for example, NUTEK was split, becoming NUTEK and The Swedish 
Agency for Innovation Systems (VINNOVA). Such changes transformed Swedish 
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policy into an innovation as opposed to merely an industrial policy (Bitard et al., 
2008). Also, in the 1980s venture capital initiatives were consolidated by numerous 
government schemes aimed at providing seed and early-stage financing for innovating 
firms. Consolidation and expansion took place in the area of the dissemination and 
commercialization of university-based research. This emphasis on domestically 
commercialised research addresses the ‘Swedish Innovation Paradox’, according to 
which high R&D intensity in Sweden is not matched by a high share of high-tech 
(R&D intensive) products in manufacturing (Edquist and McKelvey, 1998; Bitard et 
al., 2008). 
 
As can be seen from this brief summary, the success of Swedish manufacturing firms, 
in particular Swedish MNEs abroad, is largely attributable to the country’s long 
tradition of high and appropriate governmental involvement at all levels of industrial 
affairs. Although state aids in the 1970s
12
 resulted in a sub-optimal allocation of 
resources, the industrial policy of the 1980s was redeployed towards forward-looking 
measures. Large efforts were made in favour of innovation, the introduction of new 
technologies across industries, fostering SMEs, and stimulating exports as well as a 
regional balance.  
 
Swedish government policy has encouraged innovation-driven export manufacturing 
activities and SME development, particularly in latter years. The industrial policy 
response to the current crisis is again enshrined in a past, relatively successful, 
industrial trajectory. More specifically, additional funding of billion 8 Swedish krona 
has recently been allocated to University and public institutions R&D (OECD, 2009). 
                                                 
12
 Sweden postponed the downturn caused by the oil shock through an expansionary fiscal policy; as a 
result, employment rates were maintained, but wage inflation led to dwindling export shares, 
particularly in the years 1974-76. 
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A number of indicators, such as a rapid upturn in exports followed by strong 
investment and higher consumption have made possible a strong rebound in both 
economic growth and employment (Statistics Sweden, 2010). It is as if a solid 
manufacturing base, nurtured by appropriate industrial policies, had been somewhat 
resilient to the current shocks thereby allowing output, export, and employment 
growth to continue. In contrast to the Irish case, the MNE/indigenous dichotomy in 
Sweden does not coincide with a divide between large (efficient) and small (less 
efficient) firms. In Sweden, foreign firms are evenly distributed across manufacturing 
and services; indigenous firms control the highly export-oriented and technology-
based engineering sector. Is this expected possible rebound due to the ownership 
structure (indigenous versus foreign firms)? 
 
Section 4: The indigenous/foreign issue: does it matter? 
Next we explore whether firm ownership/nationality helps explain current trends 
within the manufacturing sector in Ireland and Sweden.   
 
4.1. The case of Ireland  
As evidenced from 2010 CSO data (Census of Industrial Production), employment in 
Irish firms is dominated by more traditional sectors such as food products and 
beverages; textiles and clothing; wood; paper products, publishing and printing. The 
‘complex’ economy sectors are dominated by foreign-owned firms. For example, 
foreign firms account for 80 per cent of those employed in the chemicals and 
chemical product sector. This is also the case for the electrical/optical equipment 
sector and the transport equipment sector. A more even distribution of ownership 
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occurs in the machinery and equipment sector. In contrast, Irish firms dominate 
employment across all industries in the services sector.    
 
Also, turnover is marginally dominated by Irish firms in the more traditional 
manufacturing sectors of food products and beverages, textiles and clothing, and 
wood (except furniture).  Interestingly the opposite is the case for pulp, paper, paper 
products, publishing and printing. As expected, turnover in chemicals and chemical 
products is dominated by foreign-owned firms, but so is equally turnover in 
electrical/optical equipment, other transport equipment, and leather and petroleum 
products.   Labour costs in Irish-owned firms are higher and have increased over time 
in the more traditional sectors of food products, beverages and textiles; labour costs in 
foreign firms tend to be higher in chemicals and chemical products, electrical/optical 
equipment, and transport equipment.   
Labour productivity in foreign firms is higher than in Irish firms across all sectors, 
even those where Irish firms dominate.  For example, labour productivity in the 
traditional sector of food products, beverages, textiles and clothing is almost 8 times 
higher in foreign-owned firms than in Irish-owned firms. In 1998 foreign firms in the 
chemicals sector were 8 times more productive than their Irish-owned counterparts; 
this increases to almost 10 times in 2006. The largest differential in the chemical 
sector occurred in 2002 when labour productivity in foreign owned firms was almost 
16 times higher than that which prevailed in the case of Irish firms.   
 
In all sectors over all years foreign-owned enterprises exported more than their 
indigenous counterparts (except in the case of non-metallic mineral products). 
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4.2. The indigenous/foreign issue in Swedish industry  
 
As of December 2008, there were 12,861 foreign-controlled enterprises in Sweden, 
representing a total of 621,721 employees, or approximately 15 per cent of total 
employment.
13
 Some 75 per cent of foreign-controlled firms are in the services sector. 
As shown in figure 6 the share of total employment in foreign-controlled firms has 
increased over time, particularly since Sweden entered the EU in 1995. In 2006, this 
share represented less than a quarter of employment in the business (or private) sector. 
A third of all manufacturing jobs and 20 per cent of all jobs in the services sector 
respectively are in foreign firms. Data from the Swedish Institute for Growth Policy 
Studies (2007) shows that six industries are dominated by foreign firms. These are the 
chemical industry (84 per cent of total employment), coke (79 per cent), air transport 
(70 per cent), and other non-metallic products (64 per cent). At a more refined level of 
analysis, electrical machinery (56 per cent) and motor vehicles (51 per cent) are also 
characterised by relatively high levels of employment in foreign firms. 
Figure 6 here 
 
However, the engineering sector (comprising in particular motor vehicles and 
electrical machinery) is mostly controlled by Swedish firms. Only a third of all 
employment in this industry group is in foreign controlled firms. This implies that, in 
spite of globalisation and EU membership, Swedish firms dominate employment in 
critical or high-tech industries – the reverse of Ireland. As implied above, industries in 
this category are also export-oriented. According to the Swedish Institute for Growth 
Policy Studies (2007), the motor vehicles and machinery & equipment (Swedish 
                                                 
13
 The definition of a foreign controlled enterprise is the one used by the OECD and the EU. An 
enterprise is defined as being foreign controlled, if more than 50 per cent of the voting rights are 
controlled by foreign institutional units.   
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controlled) industries represented 18.1 per cent and 16.8 per cent respectively of all 
manufacturing exports in 2007. They are also leaders in terms of labour productivity; 
electrical and optical equipment, a very indigenous industry, boasts the highest labour 
productivity rate. 
 
In terms of size, most of Sweden’s foreign controlled enterprises (87 per cent) had 
fewer than 50 employees in 2008. However, these small enterprises accounted for 
only 12 per cent of foreign-controlled employment. Large foreign enterprises (250 or 
more employees) accounted for 4 per cent of all foreign-controlled enterprises, but for 
67 per cent of foreign-controlled employment. Smaller foreign-controlled enterprises 
are more present in the services sector, whereas foreign-controlled large firms are 
more evenly distributed between manufacturing and services. This contrasts sharply 
with Ireland, where foreign firms tend to be larger than their indigenous counterparts 
in the manufacturing sector. 
 
As seen above, job losses have been a direct and immediate consequence of the 
current economic crisis. In 2009, the Swedish manufacturing sector lost 65,000 jobs 
(a 9 per cent contraction); employement in the construction industry decreased by 
19,000 persons (a 6.8 per cent decrease) (Statistics Sweden, 2009).  Inevitably, the 
contraction of investment and consumption on world markets has impacted on export-
oriented firms in Sweden with SAAB sheding 750 jobs in March 2009, and Skania 
and Volvo announcing job cuts. However, according to Statistic Sweden (2011), the 
Swedish economy experienced a quick recovery during 2010. Industrial production in 
the manufacturing industry increased by 12.7 per cent over the same time period. The 
construction sector also boomed. Domestically, household spending increased by 5.6 
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per cent in the third quarter of 2010 compared with the previous year. Exports too saw 
sustained growth throughout the year accounting for nearly 3 per cent of the 2010 
GDP growth. These very encouraging results confirm a lower vulnerability of the 
Swedish economy (compared to the Irish economy) to the current crisis. The 





Section 5: Conclusions 
Both Ireland and Sweden have been greatly affected by the recent global economic 
shock, albeit in rather different ways. Sweden’s economy rebounded with GDP 
growth of 4.4 per cent in 2010 and 2.5 per cent in 2011 while Ireland’s economy 
contracted by a further 0.2 per cent in 2010 and is expected to grow by only 2.2 per 
cent in 2011. Why has Ireland’s economy suffered a greater impact than one of a 
similar size, namely Sweden’s? Does the comparative analysis of the structure of 
production, and in particular of the manufacturing sector provide any insights?  
 
The growth in Ireland’s unemployment rate has been unprecedented, with (so far) 
most of the job losses affecting the construction sector. Growth emanating from asset 
price inflation, spurred on by a combination of low interest rates, reckless lending and 
speculation, has proven to be a poor foundation for sustainable growth in Ireland. The 
challenge for Ireland at this juncture is to offset the contraction of the cyclically-based 
construction sector with job increases in both manufacturing and services. Based on a 
comparative examination of Ireland’s industrial structure and strategy over a long 
period, the critical analysis of this paper assesses the chances that this adjustment can 




occur, which depends on the ‘quality’ of Ireland’s productive structure, on its 
sustainability. 
 
Although we agree that (price) competitiveness matters to some extent, the current 
paper highlights that a high cost economy such as Sweden can still have a more 
‘sustainable’ growth rate than that of Ireland. This, we suggest, is due to the benefits 
of adopting a balanced approach in terms of firm ownership, and an industrial policy 
which makes innovative indigenous firms a cornerstone of its industrial strategy. 
Swedish industrial strategy led to the establishment of large Swedish firms in the 
growing engineering sector, to the assistance of industries in decline through 
redeployment of workers displaced from traditional lower value-added activities 
towards more complex industries in higher value-added activities, and to a relatively 
strong focus on SMEs and stimulating exports.   
 
As a result of these different paths in industrial policy, our comparative analysis 
suggests the following findings: (i) the MNE/indigenous dichotomy exists in both 
countries, but in Sweden it is not reducible to a large (efficient) firms/ small (less 
efficient) firms dichotomy. (ii) In Ireland, foreign firms are highly concentrated in 
large and high-tech manufacturing activities, whereas in Sweden they are more evenly 
distributed across manufacturing and services. (iii) Foreign firms (mostly US-owned) 
control high technology manufacturing activities in Ireland. By contrast, indigenous 
firms control the highly export oriented and technology-based engineering sector in 
Sweden. Consequently, the US-dominated ‘complex’ manufacturing sector in Ireland, 
combined with the current disarray in the US economy, does not augur well in terms 
of allowing manufacturing activities to replace the building sector in securing 
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employment growth in Ireland. This contrasts with the resilience of Swedish 
manufacturing and of the Swedish economy, which seems to be linked to its ability to 
‘master’ its own destiny.  
 
The overall conclusion that emerges from preliminary analysis is that the degree of 
economic ‘sovereignty’ (defined for the purpose of this paper as the relative 
importance of indigenous firms in the manufacturing industry in a particular 
economy) plays an important role and is greatly shaped by industrial policy. The 
implication is that policies that emphasise an indigenous industrial development 
strategy decrease vulnerability (due to increased independence) to shocks which affect 
the manufacturing sector. Indigenous firms are more embedded into local/regional 
economies and are less likely than MNEs to exit when the going gets tough. When 
growth resumes, positive adjustments are easier and quicker in the case of Sweden, 
where expansion of production can be instantaneous thanks to a quality indigenous 
industrial/manufacturing base, than in Ireland, where such expansion primarily 
depends on inward FDI. 
 
Industrial policy implications from this analysis include the following: adopting a 
more balanced approach (in terms of the mix of indigenous and foreign firm 
ownership); promoting structural change in indigenous firms; and promoting 
entrepreneurship and innovation (which has been making some progress from a 
relatively low base) are all key ingredients for Ireland’s future industrial policy. Also, 
finding the right balance between industrial policy and other policies so as to redress 
the current univocal Irish Government fixation with monetary and budgetary policies 
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Table 1: Selected Indicators (Annual percentage change and percent, respectively) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Ireland       
(1) Real GDP (annual per cent 
change) 
5.3 5.6 -3.5 -7.5 -0.2 2.2 
(2) Current account (per cent of 
GDP) 
-3.5 -5.3 -5.2 -3.0 -2.7 -1.1 
(3) CPI (annual per cent change) 2.7 2.9 3.1 -1.7 -1.6 -0.5 
(4) ECB marginal lending rate (%) 4.5 5.0 3.0 1.75 1.75 na 
(5) Interest rate, 10-year 
government bonds (%) 




(6) General government debt (% 
of GDP) 
24.7 25.0 44.4 65.6 94.2* *98.6 
Sweden       
(7) Real GDP (annual per cent 
change) 
4.2 3.3 -0.4 -5.1 4.4 2.5 
(8) Current account (per cent of 
GDP) 
8.4 8.4 7.6 7.2 5.9 5.6 
(9) CPI (annual per cent change) 1.5 1.7 3.3 2.0 1.8 1.8 
(10) Repo rate (%) 3.0 4.0 2.0 0.25 1.25 2.0 
(11) Interest rate, 10-year 
government bonds (%) 
3.6 4.3 2.7 3.2 3.1 3.9 
(12) General government debt (% 
of GDP)  
51.0 45.9 40.5 38.0 43.4 Na 
 37 
Sources: (1), (2), (3), (7), (8), (9) IMF World Economic Outlook, World Economic 
and Financial Surveys 2010; (4), (5) Central Statistics Office (2011), Financial 
interest rate; (6) *Economic and Fiscal Outlook, Department of Finance, (2010) 
December; Budgetary and Economic Statistics 2010, Department of Finance, (2010) 
September; (10), (11), (12) Statistics Sweden (2011) and National Institute of 
Economic Research Sweden (2011) 
 
Figure 1a: Unemployment in Sweden (monthly 2005-2010; Per cent of the labour 
force unemployed)  
 
Source: EUROSTAT (2011), Unemployment Labour Force Survey,(une_rt_m), 
Luxembourge. 
 
Figure 1.b: Unemployment in Ireland (monthly 2005-2010; Per cent of the labour 
force unemployed)  
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Figure 2:  Competitiveness indicator (relative consumer prices, CPI), overall 
weights, 1970-2009 (2005 = 100)  
 
Source: OECD (2010a) database, Economic Outlook No 86: Annual and Quarterly 
data. 
 
Figure 3: Corporate income tax rate, 1981-2010 (%) 
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Source: OECD (2010b) Tax Database, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 
Taxation of Corporate and Capital Income, table II.1NB: For Ireland, the table shows 
only the higher rate of taxation for the earlier period. Between 1994 and 2003, this 
higher rate was gradually reduced from 40% to the now single rate of 12.5% applying 















Source: OECD (2010c) OECD.StatExtracts, Unit Labour Costs-Annual Indicators, 
Paris. 
*Index OECD base year 2005=100. 
 
Figure 5: Consumer Price Index of Energy*, 1970-2009 
 
Source: IEA (2009), Energy Prices and Taxes. 










Figure 6: Number of Employees in foreign controlled enterprises and their share of 
employees in the business sector (Sweden, 1980-2006) 
 
Source: Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (2007) Official Statistics of 
Sweden, S2007-005, ‘Foreign Controlled Enterprises 2006’, Stockholm, p. 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
